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Abstract: Following Bergtrom and Goodman (1973), this paper can be integrated in the set of 
studies that have estimated the demand for municipal public services. The main innovation in 
this paper is methodological as we use a Stone Geary utility function to describe the median 
voter preferences. Unlike previous studies, we are able to derive the local public expenditure 
function in a (simplified) linear expenditure system, directly from the theoretical framework. 
The linear expenditure system provides an estimate of the portion of the incompressible public 
expenditure in each municipality. Using cross sectional municipal data from France, it is 
found to be 30% of the total per capita expenditure. Compared to the specification generally 
used  in  the  literature,  linear  expenditure  system  shows  a  greater  sensitivity  to  price  and 
income variations and reveal a greater number of significant variables.   
 
Key-words:  Demand  for  local  public  services,  Median  voter,  Linear  expenditure  system, 
Nonlinear least squares. 
 







The estimation of household demand for public goods has long been a concern of public 
finance economists. Indeed, estimates to explain local (per capita) expenditures are usually 
derived from the well-known median voter model as the local fiscal behavior is “as if” it 
satisfies the median voter‟s demand for public goods, see the seminal works of Borcherding 
and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). In the literature, as the functional 
form of the median voter‟s utility function is not specified, empirical studies estimate a linear 
relation (or a log-log transformation) to explain local  public spending (per capita) by the 
median  income  and  tax  share,  in  addition  to  other  explanatory  variables  describing  the 
municipal population or approximating cost differentials in supplying public goods. See the 
papers of Colburn and Horowitz (2003) or Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994) following this 
approach. But this methodological approach is subject to methodological issues as mentioned 
by Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997) in their critical survey of the empirical literature.  
 
Particularly,  Atkinson  and  Stiglitz  (1980)  focus  on  one  issue:  „The  results  of  estimating 
median voter models provide insight into a number of aspects, but are open to a number of 
criticism… for example the specification of the functional form’.  In this article, we focus on 
the  question  of  the  functional  form  of  the  demand  function  for  public  services  and  thus 
provide one methodological innovation. More precisely, using a Stone-Geary utility function 
to describe the median voter preferences, we are able to derive the public spending function in 
a simplified linear expenditure system (with only two goods, private consumption and local 
public services). Therefore, the functional form of the public spending function is directly 
derived from the median voter model.  The linear expenditure system (LES) is a system of 
demand functions proposed by Stone (1954) by imposing theoretical restrictions (additivity, 3 
 
homogeneity  and  symmetry)  on  a  general  linear  formulation  of  demand.  Then,  our 
specification is consistent with utility maximization. And, the translating method, inspired by 
Pollack and Wales (1981), allows the introduction of variables to capture production costs and 
tax shares differences across municipalities.  
Another attractive feature is that parameters have economic meaning. Thus, LES allows to 
break down total public expenditure into two constituent parts: the incompressible part which 
may be interpreted as a minimum required local public service standard depending on the 
median voter preferences, and the variable part which depends on income and tax price levels. 
To demonstrate that the linear expenditure system has something useful to contribute to the 
existing  empirical  literature,  our  specification  is  tested  against  the  specification  generally 
used.  
 
This article is then an original contribution to the empirical public finance literature as only 
two other articles have recently used a linear expenditure system on a similar topic, Aaberge 
and Langorgen (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2011). But, their modeling approach is very 
different as it is not based on the median voter model. And they do not observe prices on local 
public services. Furthermore, they consider a system of municipal public services supposed to 
be substitutes.   
 
To deal with heterogeneity in terms of population size, we concentrate on the 109 French 
municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants in 2005 (except Paris). In France more than 
36,000 municipalities form the first local level as they provide 57% of total local public 
expenditure (45 % by municipalities and 12% by their intercommunity groups). Estimating 
the  linear  expenditure  system  with  non  linear  least  squares  (due  to  non  linearity  in 
coefficients) allows us to obtain original results.  4 
 
 
Firstly, we are able to estimate the incompressible local spending value which corresponds to, 
in average, 30% of total municipal per capita spending level. Therefore, we conclude that a 
dominant part of municipal public spending (the variable part which depends on price and 
income variations) can be reduced without threatening implications for the reelection of the 
local incumbent. 
 
According  to  the  translating  method,  two  opposite  forces  contribute  to  explain  the 
incompressible value. On the one side, an increase in the size of the population contributes to 
reduce per capita expenditure because of economies of scale in consumption. On the other 
side,  the  operating  and  capital  expenditures  targeted  on  restricted  categories  of  users 
(recipients of social benefits, expenditure in favor of tourism or transport essentially) increase 
the incompressible expenditure level. Finally, values of elasticity obtained are consistent (as 
they respect the restrictions of the specification) and reveal a greater sensitivity to the price 
and income than values obtained with the traditional method.  
 
This  article  is  organized  as  follows:  the  next  section  highlights  the  alternative  demand 
specifications. Section 3 contains a description of the data and presents the determinants of 
the incompressible spending value. In section 4, the two applications to a model explaining 
per  capita  municipal  public  spending  for  the  French  municipalities  of  more  than  50,000 







2.  Demand estimates for local public goods: two alternative functional forms 
 
The first step is the description of the standard method used in the literature. The second step 
consists of presenting the linear expenditure system. 
 
2.1 Traditional approach 
 
One traditional specification for estimating demand functions of individuals for municipal 
public services is the one proposed by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). It is based on the 
median voter model. Therefore, the demand for local public goods can be derived from the 
following simple model.  
To check the single dimension hypothesis, we can consider the total public spending G CG , 
where  G C  is the unit cost of providing public services and  G denotes the total public output. 
The economy is composed of different citizens who derive utility from public services and 
from a private consumption good x. Given the median voter's utility function Um (x, g), the 
supplied municipal commodity matches with the quantity demanded by the median voter if: 
N
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The first equation is the budget constraint of the median voter where ym is the median income 
within the local jurisdiction and bm is the median voter‟s tax base. B gathers all the local tax 
bases,  N is the population size and b is the average tax base. The second equation describes 
the budget constraint of the jurisdiction where t is the uniform municipal tax rate. 6 
 
The private consumption, measured in quantities x, serves as numeraire while g is the volume 
of local public services available for each citizen. g differs from the aggregated level G of 
local public services only when there is congestion, see (3) where  denotes the congestion 
parameter.  
To check the single dimension hypothesis, we substitute (3) in (2) to obtain an expression of 
the tax rate t to be substituted in (1). Differentiating by g and x, we obtain the marginal rate of 
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In the literature, as the functional form of the decisive voter‟s utility function is not generally 
specified,  the  estimable  function  of  local  public  expenditures  is  supposed  to  be  a  linear 
function of the tax price  g p and the median income, with additional socioeconomic variables.  
In the median voter model, tax price measures the price that the median voter considers to 
formulate her demand for public services. Tax price includes tax share 
b
bm , defined as the 
proportion of the tax burden associated with residential property, unit costs of public services  
G C , and the size of the population to deal with congestion effects. As tax price measurement 
presents some difficulties, existing studies generally retain a simplified specification. Thus, 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) assume that tax price is proportional to the median voter‟s 
tax  share.  On  the  contrary,  Borcherding  and  Deacon  (1972)  suppose  that  tax  shares  are 
identical across US States and use public wages as price variable.   
Therefore, in the spirit of Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), the level of public expenditure can 
be expressed as a linear regression of the form: 
k
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Where Exp measures total municipal expenditure (or expenditure per capita). The Xi‟s include 
the demographic characteristics of the population and variables describing cost differentials in 
supplying local public services.   is the error term.  
Then, we are able to obtain price and income elasticities of demand using parameters  and   
respectively  and  mean  values  of  median  income  and  tax  share.  Or,  if  we  apply  a  log 
transformation of all the variables, we obtain constant price and income elasticities. In the 
literature,  typical  estimates  of  price  elasticity  are  negative  whereas  income  elasticity  is 
generally positive and smaller than unity.  
 
 2.2 Linear expenditure system 
 
The originality of this paper is to specify the median voter‟s utility function in the following 
Stone-Geary form: ). (   log   ) 1 ( ) (   log   x g m m x m g U  
x m  is often considered as a subsistence level of private consumption.  g m  can be regarded as a 
minimum  required  for  local  public  services  which  depends  here  on  the  median  voter 
preferences. Fiscal need, defined as a common level of services for which each government is 
responsible,  is  a  similar  concept  developed  by  the  U.S  Advisory  Commission  on 
Intergovernmental Relations (1990).   
Then,  in  our  study,  the  local  public  expenditure  function  is  derived  from  the  following 
program  ) , (   g x U MAX m subject to  : x g   x g m p p y  




g pg  denotes per capita expenditure in each municipality and  x p is the price of the private 
consumption.  g p  is supposed here to be measured by the tax share as in Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973). 
This specification is a (simplified) linear expenditure system (LES) if we consider only two 
goods (local public services and aggregate private consumption). In this framework, some 
minimum level of each good has to be consumed, irrespective of its price or the consumer‟s 
income. So, the median voter first purchases the minimum level of each good, and the left-
over income is then allocated in fixed proportion   to the demand for local public services. 
Since public spending is usually characterized by inertia, this specification is then particularly 
well suited to account for these features of the fiscal process.  
The linear expenditure system was estimated for the first time by Stone (1954) and checks 
properties usually considered desirable from the standpoint of consumer theory (additivity, 
symmetry and homogeneity). In the general case (with n substitutes goods), LES is a system 
in which expenditures on individual commodities are expressed as n linear functions of total 
expenditures (or income) and prices. But at the empirical level, we estimate a system of n-1 
equations.  Then, as we only consider two goods here, we just have to estimate the public 
expenditure function. And, as  we are only interested in the demand for municipal public 
services,  we  suppose  that  the  minimal  private  consumption  value  can  be  incorporated  in 
parameter  : 
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Thus, the income elasticity is always positive and the municipal public goods are always 
normal goods since the marginal budget share   is positive.  Furthermore, as  , 1 0  price 
elasticity is greater than -1 and the demand is inelastic.  
 
3. Application to the municipal public expenditure  
 
Following  the  translating  method  developed  by  Pollack  and  Wales  (1981),  one  way  to 
propose a better empirical specification and to reduce unexplained variation in expenditure 
behavior  is  to  postulate  that  the  parameter  measuring  the  minimal  required  local  public 
services  is  a  function  of  the  characteristics  of  the  municipality.  So,  after  explaining  the 
decomposition of the incompressible value in the first subsection, we propose the description 
of the data in the second subsection. 
 
3.1 Determinants of the incompressible public consumption   
 
Pollack and Wales (1981) have used the translating method to allow subsistence parameters to 
depend on demographic variables. Then, the explanatory power of the econometric model is 
increased and biases in estimators are reduced. In recent cross-section analysis, Gaudin et al 
(2001), Aaberge and Langorgen (2003) and Allers and Elhorst (2011) have also implemented 
translating  methods  to  estimate  the  demand  function  for  public  services.  In  this  article, 
translating the parameter representing the minimum required local public services allows to 
include in the specification additional variables.  10 
 
 
In  the  linear  expenditure  system,  the  incompressible  public  consumption  is  by  definition 
independent of price and income. So, according to our specification, it depends here on the 
unit cost of the public services and on the number of public users (as the price variable is 
measured here by the tax share).  
 
So, if we consider the general missions intended for the whole of the population in French 
municipalities (general administration), we expect that the per capita public expenditure will 
decrease with  population size (economies of scale in consumption). But for more specific 
competences, an increase in each category of users is likely to have an opposite positive effect 
on the total expenditure per capita. Therefore, the municipal population is differentiated by 
distinguishing the main categories of users of the municipal public services in France. Then, 
we differentiate the number of school pupils (variable pupils) and the number of recipients of 
social  benefits  (variable  social  beneficiaries)  from  the  rest  of  the  municipal  population 
(variable pop).  
 
Furthermore, the cost of providing public services is supposed to depend on the size of the 
public capital stock.  According to the data availability, several variables such as the road 
network  length,  the  number  of  secondary  residences  or  the  number  of  municipal  social 
housing units may be used.  The introduction of the number of secondary residences is a 
proxy used to capture costs of public investment in terms of leisure or tourism. 
 
Therefore, mg can be defined by the following system of equations (8-12): 
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Where Y1 measures the social housing units, Y2 is the number of secondary residences, Y3 is 
the road network length. Nc measures the size of the population using the municipal public 
services, according to: 
 
ies beneficiar       N      ) 9 ( 2 1 c social pupils pop  
 
Equation  (9)  decomposes  public  users  according  to  the  different  categories  of  municipal 
beneficiaries.   
Equations (10-12) enable us to include the effect of the intercommunity group on the public 
investment level since the membership of an intercommunity group is supposed to create 
economies of scale in production. D (Intercommunity) denotes a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the municipality does not belong to a group of cooperating municipalities, 
zero  otherwise.  We  also  try  to  identify  partisan  effects  with  the  introduction  of  another 
dummy variable D(LEFT), which takes the value of one when the municipal incumbent is 
left-wing, zero otherwise: 
 
) ( ) (     ) 10 ( 22 21 20 2 Left D nity Intercommu D  
) ( ) (     ) 11 ( 32 31 30 3 Left D nity Intercommu D  
) ( ) (     ) 12 ( 42 41 40 4 Left D nity Intercommu D  
 
1, 20, 21, 22 30, 30, 31, 32, 40, 41, 42, 1and 2are the parameters to be estimated.  
Equations (8-12) are substituted in the municipal expenditure function to obtain one equation 
with non linearity in parameters.   
 12 
 
3.2 Data description  
 
As the median voter model has been found to apply to the lowest tier of localities and is 
appropriate for explaining the aggregate behavior of governments, we decide to explain the 
total expenditure per capita at the municipal level, see Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994) for 
a discussion. To deal with heterogeneity in terms of population size, we concentrate here on 
the 109 French municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants in 2005 (except Paris). The 
year 2005 is representative of the current situation of the French municipalities, posterior to 
the  latest  decentralization  laws  in  2003.  Data  are  provided  by  the  Economy  and  Interior 
ministries. 
 
The  dependent  variable  is  total  municipal  expenditure  per  capita  and  is  measured  by  the 
operating  expenditures  increased  by  gross  saving  which  covers  the  repayment  of  loans 
coming from past investments.  Such an approach seems desirable with cross-section data 
because  investment  expenditures  are  discontinued  in  the  time  dimension.  In  France,  total 
municipal spending includes a wide range of services.  Each year, municipalities must finance 
their compulsory charges corresponding to the payment of wages, loan repayment, municipal 
road maintenance costs, and traditional public services decentralized at the municipal level 
(primary  school,  general  administration,  street  lighting,  police  protection,  town  planning 
management,…). Since 2000, municipalities of more than 3,500 inhabitants must build 20% 
of social housing units, but this objective is rarely reached. Lastly, French municipalities must 
fulfill a specific social mission through the municipal center for social action. 
 
Furthermore,  we  consider  the  median  income  increased  by  the  per  capita  national  grants 
received by the municipality. The median income is computed with the distribution of the 13 
 
taxable income of households in the municipality. Note that social allowances are non-taxable 
income in France.  
Tax share is the tax base of the median voter divided by the total tax base (including the local 
business  tax)  per  inhabitant.  The  median  voter  tax  base  is  measured  by  the  sum  of  the 
occupancy tax base and the property tax base (paid by households) divided by the municipal 
population. This variable gives account for the direct influence of taxation on the choice of 
the decisive voter. It denotes the share of taxes between firms and households. The ratio is 
near 1 in residential areas, while it tends towards 0 in industrial areas. The set of available 
variables, measured in 2005, and summary statistics for all variables are given in table 1: 
 
Table 1. Data set description, 109 French municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants in 
2005 (Euros) 
Description of variables  Mean  Min  Max 
Total municipal expenditures per capita  1141  731  3137 
Yearly median municipal  income  9314  5184  36286 
Tax share  0.24  0.12  0.41 
Municipal population  106,107  50,070  807,070 
Number of social benefit beneficiaries 






Number of secondary residences  1798  90  23,560 
Number of secondary school  pupils  16,874  7010  132,000 
Number of social houses 
 (for 1000 inhabitants) 
12,005 
(120) 
600  69,200 
Road length  (meters)  224,357  27,000  1,250,000 
 
Among the 109 municipalities  of more than 50,000  inhabitants,  86 belong to  a  group of 
cooperating municipalities (80%) and 50 (46%) have a left-wing government.   14 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
In  section  4,  estimation  results  for  the  linear  expenditure  system  are  reported  (4.1)  and 
compared to the results obtained with the traditional method generally used in the literature 
(4.2). 
 
4.1 Linear Expenditure system 
 
We provide the regression results of estimating the linear expenditure system. Insignificant 
values of parameters obtained in preliminary estimations have finally been set equal to 0. In 
the same way, the value of the subsistence private consumption is fixed to be 0 to obtain 
consistent estimates
1. As the Breush-Pagan test reveals the presence of heteros cedasticity, 
robust standard errors are computed in a hetero scedastic-consistent matrix. Empirical results 
obtained using a nonlinear least squares estimate to deal with the non-linear coefficients are 
listed in table 2: 
 
Table 2.  Estimation results of the linear expenditure system 
Coefficient estimates  Value  
(probability) 
1 




(marginal budget share, quadratic form) 
 
                                                           
1  We have considered  values between 0 and 3,000 Euros a year and we have finally selected  0 according 
















(social housing, left-wing effect) 
0 
30  









(secondary residences, left-wing effect) 
0 
40  




(road length, intercommunity effect) 
0 
42  








Lm het  p-value  0.00 *** 16 
 
Schwarz B.I.C  799 
MAPE  19.22 % 
Number of observations  109 
Mean value of the estimated 
incompressible per capita public 
spending 
361 (31%) 
Significance level: ***  for 1%, ** for 5 % and * for 10 %.  
 
For each municipality, the incompressible spending value can be computed by multiplying 
g m ˆ  by the corresponding tax share. Finally, estimates show that per capita incompressible 
municipal spending is around one third, in average. Then, to go further into the interpretation 
of the “incompressible” per capita municipal public consumption, we can derive marginal 
effects with: 
   length       road   0.0039   residences Secondary     198 . 0
houses   Social   munity)) D(Intercom   0.246 (0.198     024 . 0 m ˆ      ) 13 ( g pop
 
 
So, results reveal a negative and significant impact of population size on total per capita local 
public expenditure
2. An increase of 1,000 inhabitants will result in a decrease of  -5 euros in 
per capita local expenditure.   
 
Conversely,  a  greater number of social housing ,  secondary residences,  and road length 
significantly  increases  the incompressible per capita  expenditure.  Estimates  show that an 
increase of 100 social housing units will generate an increase of  around 4 euros in per capita 











total municipal spending. Furthermore, this positive effect is larger when the municipality 
does not belong to an intercommunity group (+ 9.7 euros).  
 
The  number  of  secondary  residences  has  also  a  positive  impact  on  per  capita  municipal 
spending: 100 additional secondary residences will generate an increase of around 4 euros in 
per capita spending.  Next, an increase of the road length has a small positive impact upon 
municipal spending as 1,000 additional kilometers will generate an increase of less than one 
euro per capita.  
 
Finally, the number of social beneficiaries and of pupils have no significant impact on the per 
capita public spending level ( 0 2 1 ), nor does the partisan effect ( ). 0 42 32 22   
 
We now develop the results obtained with the standard method in the second subsection. 
Then, price and income elasticities derived from the two specifications will be presented and 
compared.  
 
4.2 Traditional method and comparison of alternative specifications 
 
We have initially used the same explanatory variables as in the linear expenditure system, 
including  specific  effects  (multiplying  variables  by  the  two  dummy  variables),  but 
insignificant values of some parameters have been obtained in a preliminary step. So, we have 
finally removed those explanatory variables. Table 3 reports final OLS estimates of the linear 




Table 3. Standard linear specification 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient estimates  
(probability) 
Constant  1012 
 (0.000)*** 
Income  0.022 
 (0.173) 
Tax share  -980 
 (0.027)*** 
Population  -0.0021 
 (0.161) 




Secondary residence  0.054 
 (0.02)** 
Road length  0.00019  
(0.381) 
Lm het  p-value  0.00 *** 
Schwarz B.I.C  757 
MAPE  13% 
Adjusted R²  0.66 
Significance level: ***  for 1%, ** for 5 % and * for 10 %.  
 
This specification offers the lowest SBIC value but this can be explained by a fewer number 
of parameters to be estimated. And the coefficients of the traditional linear specification are 
not  all  different  from  zero  at  conventional  levels  of  significance.  Then,  results  reveal 
insignificant values relating to the influence of road length, population and income on local 19 
 
public expenditure. The coefficients of other variables have the correct sign and remain stable 
compared to those obtained with the LES.  
 
Then, estimates show that an increase of 100 social housing units will generate an increase of 
around  6.5  euros  in  per  capita  spending  when  the  municipality  does  not  belong  to  an 
intercommunity group. The coefficients for tax share and income have also the predicted sign 
but are statistically different from zero for the tax share only. 
We  turn  now  to  the  distributions  of  income  and  price  elasticities  obtained  with  the  two 
different specifications, and which are described in the following table: 
 
Table  4.    Comparison  of  income  and  price  elasticities  estimated  with  the  different 
specifications 
  Specification  LES  Standard 
Price- elasticity  Mean  -0.72  -0.22 
Min  -1.14  -0.36 
Max  -0.10  -0.064 
Income- elasticity  Mean  0.69  0.18 
Min  0.32  0.08 
Max  2.32  0.62 
 
Price elasticity obtained with the standard method (last row) and  evaluated at the sample 
mean range from -0.36 to -0.064. Taken as a whole, they are lower (in absolute values) than 
with  the  linear  expenditure  system  where  price  elasticities  vary  from  -1.14  to  -0.10. 
Furthermore, the income elasticities derived from the LES reveal greater values than those 20 
 
obtained with the standard approach (mean values equal to 0.69 for LES and 0.18 for the 
standard specification (if we retain the coefficient 0.022).  
Furthermore, the estimated income elasticity is always positive. The price elasticity derived 
from the linear expenditure system must be greater than -1, by construction. But 10 estimated 
values lower than -1 are obtained. All other estimated values suit this constraint. Finally, LES 
specification performs quite well as income and price elasticities have generally the correct 
sign.   
 
Therefore, the linear expenditure system provides a richer diagnostic of household behavior in 
terms of demand for local public services than with the traditional specification: 
- By separating the variables influencing the municipal expenditure from price and income 
effects, we are able to measure the share of incompressible municipal expenditure.  
- We are able to propose a formulation of the price and income elasticities more flexible than 
usually. Thus, we obtain higher values than those obtained with the traditional method.  
-  The  knowledge  of  the  determinants  of  public  spending  is  enriched  as  we  obtain  more 
significant explanatory variables.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Following Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), a sizeable 
empirical  literature  has  used  the  median  voter  model  to  analyze  local  public  spending 
decisions.  The  main  innovation  in  this  paper  is  methodological  as  the  median  voter‟s 
satisfaction is described by a Stone Geary utility function. Then, we are able to specify the 
public spending function in a simplified linear expenditure system.  21 
 
Another  attractive  feature  is  that  such  a  specification  permits  to  decompose  local  public 
expenditure into two constituent parts: the incompressible part which may be interpreted as a 
minimum  required  local  public  service  standard,  and  the  variable  part  which  depends  on 
income and tax share. The main results show that the minimum public spending value is 31 % 
of the total and decreases with the population level and the membership of an intercommunity 
group. This confirms the existence of economies of scales in consumption and production. As 
maintenance costs are compulsory competences in French municipalities, results confirm that 
per capita public spending increases with the size of the public capital stock. 
Furthermore, income and price elasticities derived from the linear expenditure system reveal a 
greater range of values than those obtained with the standard approach. Therefore, the linear 
expenditure system retained in this article provides a richer diagnostic of household behavior 
in terms of demand for local public services. This specification really enriches the empirical 
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